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A INTRODUCTION
In this article, a comparative study of land law reform will be made with respect
to South Africa’s labour tenancy contract and Malawi’s tenant worker’s contract.1 Under
a South African labour tenancy contract, a labour tenant occupies and uses for his
or her own purposes a parcel of privately owned farmland in exchange of an
undertaking by the labour tenant to work for or supply labour to the owner of the
land for a specified period of the year.2 Under a Malawian tenant worker’s con-
tract, the private estate owner grants the tenant worker access to a parcel of land on
private estate land, and material agricultural inputs and services, in consideration
for an undertaking by the tenant worker to produce and sell agricultural commodi-
ties to the private estate owner. Although this article makes a comparative analy-
sis of two separate jurisdictions, each contract does encapsulate common features,
identifiable  from a range of perspectives.3
Both the labour tenancy contract and tenant worker’s contract emerged on the
farms of South Africa and on the private estates of Malawi as a consequence of
colonialism. Their emergence reflects the negative view each of the colonial States
* PhD (UCC). Department of Law, University College Cork, Ireland.
1 S Banda, ‘The Limits of Law: The Private Estate, the Tenant Worker and Commodity Production
in Malawi’ (PhD Thesis, University College Cork 2006). I will use the term ‘tenant worker to refer
to a person engaged in tenant worker’s contract. The ‘tenant worker’ is also referred to as a ‘private
estate squatter’, a ‘visiting tenant’ or a ‘tenant sharecropper’—this last term appears in s 3 of
Malawi’s Employment Act 1999 (No 6 of 2000)—.
2 See M Hathorn and D Hutchison, ‘Labour Tenants and the Law’ in C Murray and C O’Regan
(eds), No Place to Rest: Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (OUP, Cape Town 1990) 194. 
3 These contracts represent, sociologically speaking, mechanisms for access to otherwise inaccessi-
ble land. Historically they emerged as a consequence of the inequitable colonial reconstitution of
the socio-legal order. Economic and development policy viewed them as transient and awkward
institutions incompatible with the modern capitalist relations of production. The legal rights of
both the labour tenant and the tenant worker have been truncated. From a land reform perspec-
tive, they have both been the subject of campaigns aimed at attaining dignity, legal rights and
secure tenure.
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had of the indigenous systems of customary land tenure and their eventual mar-
ginalisation4 through legal, social and economic policies of racial discrimination.5
Prior to the establishment of the pluralist political system, South African society
had relatively intense and sustained debates respecting the land question.
Consequently,  the Constitution of South Africa has provisions that expressly sup-
port the land law reform process.6 Land reform in South Africa is therefore intended
to address the legal, social and economic distortions that resulted from policies of
racial discrimination.7 Similarly, in Malawi, grievances over the land question con-
stituted an important rallying point in the country’s re-democratisation process in
the early 1990s. Even the Malawian Government has recognised that the land ques-
tion had not been dealt with equitably.8 While Malawi’s Constitution does not have
a provision expressly mentioning land reform, some of its provisions may be con-
strued as allowing for land reform.9
Nevertheless, the contemporary responses by Malawi and South Africa to the
historic inequity incorporated in the labour tenant contract and the tenant
worker’s contract have little in common. For its part, South Africa has adopted a
robust approach towards the rectification of the historic injustice that has charac-
terised the labour tenancy contract. This has been done in the context of South
Africa’s land reform programme,10 mirrored to some extent in Malawi. 
In this regard, Malawi has recently formulated and adopted a new land policy,
which is expected to form the basis for a comprehensive land law reform initia-
tive.11 It has acknowledged in various fora the tenant worker’s deplorable social,
economic and legal situation on the private estate. However, Malawi’s new land
policy does not make any reference to the tenant worker, the tenant worker’s con-
tract or the obvious need to undertake corrective action. This is a strong indica-
tion that the proposed land policy will not address the social, economic and legal
deficits underlying the plight of the tenant worker.12
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4 See TW Bennett, ‘African Land—A history of Dispossession’ in R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds),
Southern Cross: Civil and Common Law in South Africa (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 65–94. See also 
JP McAuslan, Bringing the Law Back In: Essays in Land, Law and Development (Ashgate, Aldershot 2003)
ch 4.
5 See H Mostert, ‘The Case of the Richtersveld Community: Promoting Reconciliation or Effecting
Division?’ [2002] 1 Tyds S Afr R 160, 165–167 where it is stated that this is combated by the objec-
tive of the land law reform process.
6 See the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. See also pp 213–14, below. 
7 H Mostert, ‘Land Restitution, Social Justice and Development in South Africa’ (2000) 119 SALJ
400, 403–05.
8 Republic of Malawi, Ministry of Lands, Housing, Physical Planning and Surveys, Malawi National Land
Policy (Lilongwe 2002) [1.1.3]–[1.1.4], [2.3]–[2.4]. <http://www.malawi.gov.mw/publications/
landpol.htm> accessed 27 December 2006 
9 Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act (No 20 of 1994); text to n 23, below. 
10 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs, ‘White Paper on South African Land
Policy’, (Department of Land Affairs, Pretoria 1997). See also DL Carey Miller and A Pope, ‘South
African Land Reform’ (2000) 44 J Afr L 167, 167–194. 
11 Malawi Land Policy Document (n 8).
12 The Malawi Law Commission has been given the task, among others, to review existing land legis-
lation and to develop a new legislative framework for land matters. Although not meant to be
In this article, attention is drawn to these divergent responses. It will be argued
that Malawi’s response is inconsistent with the domestic concern expressed over
the social, economic and developmental status of the tenant worker and with
domestic constitutional obligations and regional trends. Moreover, it will be
argued that South Africa’s response provides Malawi with a reference point for the
formulation of corrective action appropriate to the circumstances that prevail on
the private estates of Malawi.  A brief history of the conditions that led to the 
emergence of the labour tenancy contract and the tenant worker’s contract will be
provided, followed by a historical discussion of the regulatory frameworks of the
South African labour tenancy contract and the Malawian tenant worker’s 
contract, as well as their impact on labour tenants and tenant workers.   Later on,
the contemporary responses by both South Africa and Malawi to these historical
phenomena in the context of their land law reform programmes will be discussed.
On the basis of a comparative analysis, it can indeed be considered that South
Africa’s response to the historical situation of the labour tenant offers invaluable
lessons for Malawi. 
It will also be argued that Malawi must re-constitute the tenant worker’s con-
tract within a framework that promotes the personal development of the tenant
worker as a right-bearer.  Furthermore Malawi must craft a comprehensive and
sustainable response to the situation of the tenant worker’s contract along the lines
adopted by the South African approach. Ultimately, it will become apparent that
while this process may face institutional and structural challenges and perhaps
opposition from vested interests, concerns over the social, economic and develop-
mental circumstances of the tenant worker as well as domestic constitutional
obligations and regional trends should provide a justification for a reform of the
tenant worker’s contract. 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE LABOUR TENANT AND THE
TENANT WORKER IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
1 South Africa and the Historical Context of the Labour Tenant
As stated above, the emergence of the labour tenant’s contract in South Africa is a
direct consequence of the attitudes prevalent during the colonial period. The devel-
opment of the labour tenancy contract is linked to the Natives Land Act 1913,13
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exhaustive, a list of legislation earmarked for review was published and it did not include legislation
applicable to the tenant worker and the tenant worker’s contract. At the time this article went to
press, the ‘Report on the Review of Land Related Laws’ was not published online. See Republic of
Malawi, Law Commission, ‘Malawi Law Commission Official Website’ <http://www.
lawcom.mw/index.htm?http%3A//www.lawcom.mw/land.htm> accessed 17 January 2007.
13 Act 27 of 1913 (later renamed Black Land Act 1913). See C Bundy, ‘Land, Law and Power: Forced
Removals in Historical Context’ in Murray and O’Regan (n 2) 5–8. See also Hathorn and
Hutchison (n 2) 195 where the history of labour tenancy is discussed. 
which was enacted so as to legally justify and formalise the use of racial grounds as
a criterion of access to land. The purpose of the Natives Land Act 1913 was to facil-
itate the proletarianisation of South Africans categorised as blacks and to create a
white landowning class. In practice, because of the provisions of the Natives Land
Act 1913, independent access to land by black persons was restricted to relatively
small and agriculturally unproductive designated areas: the so-called ‘scheduled
areas’.
Overnight, this Act turned South African black landowners into squatters on
their own land. Section 1 of the Natives Land Act 1913 prohibited a black person
from entering into ‘any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire or other
acquisition from a person other than a native’ of any land outside the designated
areas. Its purpose was to eliminate independent forms of existence by black people
on lands the state had reserved for white people. Consequently, blacks had the
‘option’ of either relocating to the designated areas, where independent living
could be pursued, or of remaining on what was previously their land—now the
property of the white landowning class—and lead dependent livelihoods.14 The
Labour Tenancy Contract provided a mechanism that enabled both land-expro-
priated blacks and the white landowning class to get around the restrictions on
land access by black people. Furthermore, the labour tenancy contract did not fall
within the ambit of the Natives Land Act 1913, on the basis that it did not consti-
tute an agreement or transaction for the ‘purchase, hire or acquisition’ of land.
2 The Tenant Worker’s Contract in Colonial and Post-Colonial
Malawi
In colonial Malawi, the tenant worker’s contract emerged as the dominant con-
tractual relationship in the commodity production labour process of the private
estate.15 This domination was due to several factors. 
First, the Malawian colonial state engaged in restrictive commodity production
policies.16 Before the 1940s, the colonial state viewed economic development as
contingent on the establishment of an expatriate white landowning class engaged
in private estate commodity production. In order to support the commodity pro-
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14 Black people lived ‘dependent livelihoods’ in the sense that access to the use of land by the labour
tenant was conditional on compliance with the terms of the labour tenancy contract.
15 I define the term ‘labour process’ as the use of labour for the purpose of ‘capitalist production, accu-
mulation and profit’. See T Brass and H Bernstein, ‘Introduction: Proletarianisation and
Deproletarianisation on the Colonial Plantation’ in EV Daniel, H Bernstein and T Brass (eds),
Plantations, Proletarians and Peasants in Colonial Asia (Cass, London 1992) 6. 
16 See J McCracken, ‘Planters, Peasants and the Colonial State: The Impact of the Native Tobacco
Board in the Central Province of Malawi’ (1983) 9 Journal of Southern African Studies 172,
176–83. See also J McCracken, ‘Share-Cropping in Malawi: The Visiting Tenant System in the
Central Province C. 1920–1968’ in Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, ‘Malawi:
An Alternative Pattern of Development’ (Seminar Proceedings No 25, Centre of African Studies,
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh 1985) 35, 44–51.
duction of the white property-owning class, the colonial state restricted the small
(black) farmer’s commodity production. As a result, the Malawian small farmer
was compelled to engage in contractual agreements with private estate owning
classes in order to produce commodities on the latter’s private estates. This con-
tractual agreement, the tenant worker’s contract, enabled the small farmer to par-
ticipate in lucrative commodity-producing activities in an otherwise hostile
commodity production environment.  
Second, the Malawian private estate owner could not sustain commodity pro-
duction on the basis of a wage-earning workforce. Therefore, the estate owner
resorted to engaging small farmers in the tenant worker’s contract.17 However,
despite of the best efforts of the colonial Malawian state and the expatriate com-
mercial and agriculture business community, a labouring class completely depen-
dent on wage-earning was almost non-existent18 because the private estate owning
class faced competition for labour from better paying domestic commercial enter-
prises, the mining centres of South Africa and of Northern and Southern Rhodesia
(now Zambia and Zimbabwe), as well as from independent commodity produc-
tion by the small farmer. 
For post-colonial Malawi, the production of agricultural commodities has been
a major generator of economic growth. The post-colonial state’s policies have per-
petuated inequality between private estate agriculture and small farmer agricul-
ture favouring the former over the latter. However, a fundamental change
occurred in the ranks of the private estate owning class in that it underwent a pur-
posive policy of africanisation.19 Parallel to this policy, there was a considerable
expansion of the private estate sector linked to the fortunes of Malawi’s small 
farmers on a number of levels through the pursuit of specific policies in favour of
private estate commodity production. 
The post-colonial state has overseen a further concentration of power in the
state for the determination of land access and land use. Institutions that regulate
customary land tenure have been weakened and manipulated in order to serve the
particular needs of private estate commodity production.20 The expansion of the
private estate sector and the intensification of the private estate commodity pro-
duction fundamentally depended on the conversion of customary land to private
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17 R Palmer, ‘White Farmers in Malawi: Before and After the Depression’ (1985) 84, Afr Aff 211,
235–39.
18 MOJ Chipeta, ‘Labour in Colonial Malawi: A Study of the Growth and Development of the
Malawian Working Class, C. 1891–1961’ (PhD thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax 1986) 459–60. 
19 GCZ Mhone, ‘The Political Economy of Malawi—An Overview’ in GCZ Mhone (ed), Malawi at
the Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Political Economy (Sapes, Harare 1992) 6. See also McCracken 1985 
(n 16) 58–59. 
20 See: RM Mkandawire and CD Phiri, ‘Assessment of Land Transfer from Smallholders to Estates’
(World Bank, Eastern and Southern Africa Project, Washington DC 1987) 57–58; Republic of
France, Ministry of Agriculture, Bureau pour le Developpement de la Production Agricole, ‘Final
Report on the Customary Land Utilisation Study’ (Lilongwe 1998) 99–103. 
land through the Land Act.21 The post-colonial state facilitated the acquisition of
converted customary land by prospective private estate operators through leases
made under the Land Act,.22 As a result, more private estates were created, the
private estate sector expanded and a post-colonial constituency of dispossessed
rural communities was built on account of this conversion of customary land. 
Another aspect linking the expansion of the Malawian private estate sector and
the fortunes of small farmers has been the control of peasant agriculture produc-
tion and the marketing of peasant commodity products. Through the Special
Crops Ordinance, 1963, post-colonial agricultural policy precluded the small
farmer from participating in the agricultural production of specified commodi-
ties.23 Further legislation established restrictive marketing mechanisms whereby
the small farmers were compelled to market their produce through the state,24
thereby deliberately advancing the interests of the private estates. 
This way of structuring the small farmer’s commodity production and market-
ing, combined with the constant diminution of customary land reserves, a rapid
population growth rate and a labour market devoid of employment opportunities
had an impact on the private estate operator’s capacity to access labour. The small
farmer’s capacity to engage in independent livelihood was undermined, a situation
which has compelled the members of the small farmer’s class on the margins to
seek employment in the private estate sector through the tenant worker’s contract.
Consequently, the tenant worker’s contract continues to be a dominant feature on
Malawian private estates.
C THE TENANT WORKER: A DISTINCT LEGAL CLASS ON
PRIVATE ESTATES
Malawian law recognises three different categories of residents in private estates,
among which the tenant worker. Established under the Africans on Private Estates
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21 Malawi Land Act, 1965 (No. 25 of 1965) s 2 under which land in Malawi comes under three cat-
egories: private land, public land and customary land. Until the early 1990s, lucrative commodity
production could only be carried out on land registered as private land. However, there being no
reserves of private land, other categories—mostly customary land—were converted into private
land.
22 See Malawi Land Act (n 21) s 5. See C Ng’ong’ola, ‘Customary Law, Land Tenure and Policy in
Some African Countries at the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century’ in GE van Maanen and 
AJ van der Walt (eds), Property law on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Proceedings of International
Colloquium, Maastricht 28–30 August 1995, MAKLU, Antwerp 1996). 
23 No. 27 of 1963 (now repealed). 
24 See CHS Ng’ong’ola, ‘Statutory Control of Land and The Administration of Agrarian Policies in
Malawi’ (PhD Thesis, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies 1983) ch VI.
See also: I Livingstone, ‘Agricultural Development Strategy and Agricultural Pricing Policy in
Malawi’ in K Arhin, P Hesp and L van de Laan (eds), Marketing Boards in Tropical Africa (KPI Ltd,
London 1985) 172, 177–85; J Kydd and R Christiansen, ‘Structural Changes in Malawi Since
Independence: Consequences of a Development Strategy Based on Large-Scale Agriculture’ (1982)
10 World Development 355, 366–71; Mhone (n 19) 19–20. 
Ordinance, 196225 (now Africans on Private Estates Act, 1962)26—and originally
the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1928—27, this system must be under-
stood in light of colonial policy in Malawi. 
Following the establishment of the Protectorate of Nyasaland,28 the colonial
state made land grants to a white private estate owning class.  Communities that
claim to have been dispossessed of rights of ownership and use in respect of the
lands granted contest the legitimacy of these land grants. Therefore there are two
broad categories of people residing on the private estates. The first category con-
stitutes people who are resident on the private estate on account of contractual
relations.  The second category comprises communities which claim rights of own-
ership and use over private estate lands, on the basis of a historical and cultural
connection to them. 
The Africans on Private Estates Act provides a framework for distinguishing
these different classes of residents on private estates. It also provides a framework
for the reconciliation of competing interests in land on the private estates between
the residents on the private estate, on the one hand, and the private estate owning
classes, on the other.29 Under the Act, the claims of the Malawian dispossessed
communities were purportedly addressed by recognising the right of the members
of these communities to live on parts of the private estate lands under specified
conditions.30 The Act recognises three classes of residents on private estates:
1 The dispossessed communities, who have a statutory right to reside on the pri-
vate estate lands. They are referred to as ‘resident Africans’.31
2 The employees of the private estate, referred to by the Act as ‘exempted
Africans’.32
3 Tenant workers and other persons who reside on the private estate pursuant to
land access agreements, referred to as persons under a ‘special agreement’.33
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25 No 12 of 1962. 
26 Although originally enacted as an ‘ordinance’, this piece of legislation has been known as the
Africans on Private Estates Act since independence, and it will be referred to as such hereafter.
27 No 15 of 1928. This ordinance was replaced by the Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25).
28 Nyasaland was the name of Malawi before independence (1964). It had been known as the
Protectorate of Nyasaland since 1907, but it was originally established as the British Central Africa
Protectorate in 1891.
29 B Pachai, Land and Politics in Malawi, 1875–1975 (Limestone Press, Kingston 1978) ch VII. See also
C Baker, Seeds of Trouble: Government Policy and Land Rights in Nyasaland, 1946–1964 (British Academic
Press, London 1993) chs 2, 3. 
30 The expansion of the private estate sector in the post-colonial period has also produced communi-
ties who dispute the legitimacy of the ownership of private estate lands. However, the Africans on
Private Estates Act (n 25) has neither been applied to this situation nor has it been used at all since
1970. 
31 See Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25) ss 3, 5. The purpose of the bill was described as ending
‘Thangata’: a maligned practice of the private estate owning classes whereby the dispossessed com-
munities were compelled to offer their labour for a specified period in the year in exchange for rights
of residence. See Nyasaland Protectorate, Legislative Council, Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting of the
Seventy Sixth Session of the Legislative Council (June 1, 1962) 266 ff.
32 Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25) s 3.
33 Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25) ss 3, 25.
In the following section, it will be shown how legislation, the principles of law and
the administration of the law were employed, both in South Africa and Malawi, to
reinforce the weak position that the labour tenant and the tenant worker has had
in relation to farmland and private estate land respectively.
D THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS OF THE LABOUR TENANCY
CONTRACT AND THE TENANT WORKER’S CONTRACT
1 South Africa: The Regulation of the Labour Tenancy Contract
The rationale of the legal regime constituted by South Africa’s Natives Land Act
1913 was to prevent or limit the acquisition of proprietary rights in land by speci-
fied classes of people. The emergence and endurance of the labour tenancy con-
tract was closely linked to a wider state project aimed at the development of
capitalist production relations.  The Government’s attitude towards the labour
tenancy contract swung from grudging tolerance (1913–1948) to extreme hostility
(after 1948). The labour tenancy contract was tolerated when the authorities held
a sympathetic attitude towards cash-strapped property owners who were unable
to engage wage-earning workers. The use of labour tenants proved to be a cheaper
option for the property owners. The later hostility, on the other hand, was a 
reflection of the attitude of the state towards labour tenancy, which it now per-
ceived as an economically awkward and retrogressive institution of production.
Furthermore, labour tenancy undermined the policies of racial segregation pur-
sued by the apartheid state. 
During the period of ‘grudging tolerance’ (1913–1948), the Native Service
Contract Act was enacted.34 It recognised, defined and regulated the detailed
aspects of the labour tenancy contract. Under the Native Service Contract Act, the
parties to the contract were not required to satisfy any formalities to enter into the
contract, which lasted for one year, extendable for a period of one to three 
additional years. The Act also provided for the termination of the labour tenancy
contract and all formalities required for it. Through subsequent legislation,35 a
Labour Tenant Control Board was established to register, monitor and control the
number of labour tenants on a farm.  
In the period following 1948, hostility towards the labour tenancy contract
intensified and culminated in the passage of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act.36
The purpose of this Act was to annihilate the labour tenancy contract and to
remove ‘surplus’ labour tenants from white owned farmland in South Africa. It is
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34 Act 24 of 1932. See Hathorn and Hutchison (n 2) 195–96 where this Act is discussed.
35 See Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, ch IV. This Act was later renamed ‘Development Trust
and Land Act’. 
36 Act 42 of 1964 which repealed the South Africa Native Service Contract Act (n 34) and amended
the South Africa Native Trust and Land Act (n 35).
estimated that some 340,000 labour tenants were removed from white-owned
land between the years 1960–1970 and that a further 400,000 were removed from
such lands between the years 1971–1974.37 By 1986, the Government could vir-
tually have declared itself victorious in its efforts to annihilate labour tenancy.38
Nevertheless, labour tenancy did survive, mainly in the provinces of Mpumalanga
and KwaZulu Natal.39
In the absence of legislation since the passing of the Bantu Laws Amendment
Act, the labour tenancy contract was regulated on the basis of South African con-
tract law, which has always been uncertain on the point of whether the labour ten-
ancy contract constitutes a lease and a contract of service or a contract of
employment.40 From a legal perspective this distinction is of fundamental impor-
tance, because if labour tenancy was considered a lease, the labour tenant could
potentially acquire proprietary rights under South African law. This capacity to
acquire proprietary rights would have had profound social and economic implica-
tions for the labour tenants, as their tenure would become relatively more secure. 
Alas, such an interpretation would ran afoul of the Natives Land Act 1913. In
De Jager v Sisana,41 it was held that a labour tenancy contract was not a lease.  The
labour tenancy could be construed as either a contract of employment or an
‘innominate contract’.42 Although labour tenants were able to seek the usual pro-
tections offered by contract law, their rights were less than those of proprietors.
Consequently, the tenure of a labour tenant party to a labour tenancy contract—
if construed as an innominate contract—was less secure than the tenure enjoyed
under a lease, but more secure than the tenure conferred by a contract of employ-
ment. 
In spite of these distinct implications in law, these differences were mostly aca-
demic for the South African labour tenant, as the odds were stacked heavily
against him. Since labour tenants reside in rural and isolated places, their strug-
gles have enjoyed poor visibility and ‘are further distanced from legal institutions
because the law is obscure and remote’.43 The owners of farms hardly paid any
attention to the finer points of law when seeking the removal of a labour tenant
from their land. 
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37 See Hathorn and Hutchison (n 2) 197 where these figures are attributed to M Morris, ‘State
Intervention and the Agricultural Labour Supply post-1948’ in F Wilson, A Kooy and D Hendrie
(eds), Farm Labour in South Africa (David Phillip, Cape Town 1977) 71.
38 See the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986 which repealed Chapter IV of the South Africa
Native Trust and Land Act (n 35). All racially discriminatory land laws were finally abolished by the
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991.
39 A statutory framework has been enacted, which partly aims to phase out labour tenancy. This will
be discussed in a subsequent part of this article. See pp 210–14, below
40 See Hathorn and Hutchison (n 2) 198–200.
41 1930 AD 71 at 76 per Curlewis JA and at 83 per Wessels JA.
42 See De Jager (n 41) 84 per Wessels JA. See also Hathorn and Hutchison (n 2) 199–200.
43 N Haysom, ‘Rural Land Struggles: Practising Law Democratically’ in Murray and O’Regan (n 2)
107. See also A Ditlhake, ‘Labor Tenancy and the Politics of Land Reform in South Africa’ in 
R Levin and D Wiener (eds), No More Tears: Struggles for Land in Mpumalanga, South Africa (Africa World
Press, Trenton 1997) 226, 228–30.
Furthermore, the concerns of labour tenants simply could not be addressed 
by compliance with the required technicalities of the law applicable to the labour
tenancy contract at the time. Fundamentally, the labour tenant claims a historical
and cultural link to the land on which he was forced to eke out a precarious 
existence without the protection of substantive rights. For the labour tenant, the
basis on which the property rights of the farmland owners was established 
lacked legitimacy, because the legal regime creating them did not guarantee 
effectively—or at all—the property  rights of the majority population.44 These
rights were truncated or extinguished on the authority of violence under the garb
of law.45
In the wake of South Africa’s new constitutional system, statutory law has
expressly intervened in the situation of the labour tenant in certain distinct ways.
First, a legal framework has been put in place that aims to enhance the security of
tenure of the labour tenant. Secondly, on the basis of a special legal mechanism, a
labour tenant is now able to acquire rights of ownership to the land which he or
she occupies. A further and perhaps more controversial development of the law
has seen the labour tenant being granted protection against successors in title of
farmland owners, a right previously denied to him by South African common
law.46
2 Malawi: the Regulation of the Tenant Worker
As for Malawi, the special agreement provides a legal framework for the constitu-
tion of the tenant worker’s contract on private estates. It does not, however,
expressly state or clarify whether there are any proprietary implications that flow
from the special agreement and the nature of such proprietary implications.47
Similarly, the special agreement does not restrict the relationships arising out of
commodity production to a particular type of contract. Functionally, the
Malawian special agreement provides a legal framework for the creation of con-
tractual relationships on the private estate whose primary purpose is the produc-
tion of commodities referred to under the Africans on Private Estates Act as
economic crops.48 The contract must be written and it must provide for access to
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44 EF Kanyongolo, ‘The Limits of Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism in Malawi’ in KM Phiri and
KR Ross (eds), Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (CLAIM, Blantyre 1998) 368 (‘not guaranteed
effectively or at all’); Ditlhake (n 43) 220–26.
45 Ditlhake (n 43) 224–28. 
46 This is because the huur gaat voor koop rule—the one allowing for protection against successors in
title—did not reach the labour tenancy contract, as this rule applies to leases. See MD Southwood,
The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights by Expropriation, Way of Necessity, Prescription, Labour Tenancy and
Restitution (Juta, Landsdowne 2000) 134–38; see also discussion at pp 217–18, below. 
47 A tenant worker does exercise limited land use rights such as the right to draw water, to use fuel and
burial rights. These can constitute proprietary rights under Malawi land law, but they are of a lim-
ited nature.
48 See Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25) s 3 where economic crops are defined as ‘such crops as
are grown for sale and not for the consumption of the grower or his family’.
land. Furthermore, the minister concerned must be satisfied that the terms of the
contract guarantee adequate security of tenure and that the contract is fair and
equitable.49
The use of the special agreement in the creation of the tenant worker’s contract
in both the colonial and the post-colonial period has not been impressive. Under
the colonial regime, the private estate owning class sought to exclude the tenant
worker’s contract from the scope of the old Natives on Private Estates Ordinance,
1928.50 The private estate owning class was keen on creating the impression that
the tenant worker’s contract did not confer proprietary rights on the tenant
worker, although as an absolute view this position is incorrect both in law and in
equity. They lobbied the colonial administration to adopt a laissez faire policy with
respect to their activities on the private estate, including the tenant worker’s con-
tract. The private estate owning class argued for self-regulation on the grounds
that it was economically wise to do so and that it was politically compatible with
liberal ideals. 
From the point of view of the private estate owning class, this laissez faire approach
represented the desire to set boundaries beyond which the colonial administration
could not legitimately extend its reach, as well as an expression of the colonial
regime’s own commitment to respect private property.51 Regulation in all its forms
was resented and viewed as an expression of paternalism by the colonial administra-
tion. Furthermore, the private estate owning class argued unconvincingly that the
provisions of the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1928 did not cover the ten-
ant worker and the tenant worker’s contract on the basis that the Natives on Private
Estates Ordinance, 1928 applied only to a designated area and only to specific pri-
vate estates. A plausible technical reason was that contrary to formal requirements of
the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1928, many a private estate owner did not
wish to reduce the tenant worker’s contract into written form.  Non-compliance,
from the perspective of legal formalism, removed the tenant worker from the ambit
of the special agreement. In spite of a penalty for non-compliance with this require-
ment under the Act, no private estate owner was ever prosecuted.
Similarly, Malawi’s post-colonial52 enforcement record of the Africans on
Private Estates Act on private estates has been dismal because of strategic 
developmental interests of the state.53 Unlike during the colonial period, the 
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49 See Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25) s 25. Such an interventionist approach requiring an overt
act on the part of the minister sits uncomfortably with the orthodox common law approach to pro-
prietary rights. 
50 See n 27, above.
51 S Hynde, a publisher and private estate operator, stated that ‘any control . . . will be resented as it
interferes with owners and leases of private land’. See S Hynde, Letter to the Chief Secretary, Protectorate
Administration dated 23 June 1924 (Malawi National Archives SI/1879/24). 
52 Malawi attained self-government in 1962, independence in 1964 and republican status in 1966.
53 The non-application of the Africans on Private Estates Act to the tenant worker’s contract is consist-
ent with the post-colonial development approach, which has been based on private estate commod-
ity production. For a discussion of the post-colonial development approach, compare Kydd and
Christiansen (n 24) where the main argument is that the dominance of private estate agriculture in
post-colonial application of the Africans on Private Estates Act has not been uni-
versal and happens by proclamation alone.54 In the absence of legislative inter-
vention, the regulation of the tenant worker’s contract is dependent on a common
law contract. In post-colonial Malawi, state practice, the conduct of the private
estate owners and the social position of the tenant worker have combined to cre-
ate a strong and enduring impression that the tenant worker’s contract, as a social
institution that mediates land relations, is a legal aberration. This impression con-
veys that there is no law, statutory or otherwise, specifically addressing the tenant
worker’s contract. Officials of state ministries with responsibility for aspects that
relate to the private estates view the question about the tenant worker’s position
on the private estate as a source of irritation. In the Department of Land Affairs,
the tenant worker and the tenant worker’s contract are not considered to fall
within the Department’s official remit of responsibility. This suggests complicity in
the view that a jural relationship does not exist between the private estate owner
and the tenant worker.55
The post-colonial private estate owner, like his colonial counterpart, views the
tenant worker’s association with the private estate solely in terms of a relationship
to produce a commodity without any jural implications. The post-colonial private
estate owner does not wish to create the impression that proprietary rights—rights
other than personal rights—extend to the tenant worker by virtue of his contract
with the private estate owner. A clear implication of this is the removal of any sug-
gestion that a proprietary relationship may exist in law. The tenant workers are
viewed as not being able to establish a ‘psycho-spatial separation between their
land and those of others’.56 In legal parlance, the tenant worker does not have
exclusive possession, a notion that ‘imports a hidden structure of rules which crit-
ically define the legal phenomenon of private property’.57
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Malawi is attained by deliberate Government policy and Banda (n 1) where this argument is
expanded further, by arguing that the Africans on Private Estates Act has not been enforced because
the Government did not wish to undermine the strategic role of the private estate. See also FL Pryor
and C Chipeta, ‘Economic Development Through Estate Agriculture: The Case of Malawi’ (1990)
24 Can J Afr Stud 50, 51–61 especially; Mhone (n 19) 13–20. 
54 See Africans on Private Estates Act (n 25) s 2.
55 See Banda (n 1) ch 5. A couple of points may be put forth as evidence of this assertion. The land
policy published under the auspices of the ministry of the Malawi Government responsible for lands
poignantly fails to address the status of the tenant worker and the tenant worker’s contract. See
Malawi Land Policy Document (n 8). The ministry is responsible for the land rights registration sys-
tem for both registered and unregistered land. To that extent, a suggestion that the tenant worker’s
contract does not fall within the area of responsibility of the ministry implies that the tenant worker’s
contract does not give rise to proprietary interests in land.  
56 A Grear, ‘A Tale of the Land, the Insider, the Outsider and Human Rights (An Exploration of
Some Problems and Possibilities in the Relationship between the English Common Law Property
Concept, Human Rights Law, and Discourses of Exclusion and Inclusion)’ (2003) 23 LS 33, 36–39.
Psycho-spatial in this context means that the tenant worker, in his or her relationship to land, is
viewed as a person who does not have the legal capacity to conceptually (‘psycho’) and physically
(‘spatial’) exclude others from the land.
57 K Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 CLJ 252, 269.
In a practical sense, the tenant worker has been cast outside the remit of land law
and characterised as a person who may only become a subject of land law under
appropriate circumstances. As a ‘potential’ subject of land law, the tenant worker
in Malawi is caught up in what Tomasson Jannuzi refers to as ‘definitional obfus-
cation’.58 In spite of the use of the word ‘tenant’, the tenant worker is portrayed as
a person who does not have a recognised claim in law or in equity to the use of land
on the private estate. There is no indication by either the state or the private estate
owners of the recognition of proprietary land rights of the tenant worker. 
Similarly, the tenant worker has not fared well with regard to the specific ques-
tion of security of tenure. Although the Africans on Private Estates Act does
attempt to address this question, it may be argued that the question of security of
tenure ought to be dealt with independently from the question of whether the ten-
ant worker acquires proprietary rights under a tenant worker’s contract. This is
mainly because the responsible minister has not adhered to the requirement set by
the Africans on Private Estates Act that he or she must be satisfied the terms of the
contract do guarantee adequate security of tenure. 
The non-recognition of proprietary implications of the tenant worker’s contract
and the non-observance of statutory mechanisms aimed at enhancing the security
of tenure of the tenant worker creates adverse effects for the tenant worker. A land
access mechanism ought to be conceptualised as a ‘relationship that is subservient
to the social’ as opposed to a mere facilitative technical tool or structure.59 This
approach is justified on social, economic, and developmental bases.60 Studies have
repeatedly shown that as a social institution of production, it is the tenant worker
who bears the largest share of risk of production.61 The conception of an employ-
ment relationship as the only valid legal characterisation of the tenant worker’s
contract is too rigid a view and does not address the social, economic and devel-
opmental concerns that pertain to the tenant worker. Studies on agricultural ten-
ancies also indicate that, from an economic point of view, efficiency of agriculture
is linked to guarantees of long-term access to land because such access facilitates
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58 F Tomasson Jannuzi, India’s Persistent Dilemma: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform (Westview Press,
Inc., Boulder 1994) 147.
59 See McAuslan 2003 (n 4) 5 where it is stated: ‘We can in fact isolate two broad approaches to land
in society; one of which sees land as basically part of the social relations between people and soci-
ety, the other of which sees land as basically part of the economic relations between persons and
persons in society.’
60 This is based on the law in context model approach to the discussion of property law. See M Doupe
and M Salter, ‘Property Law: Between Private Rights and Public Policy’ in P Jackson and DC Wilde
(eds), Contemporary Property Law (Ashgate, Aldershot 1999) 82–87. See also McAuslan 2003 (n 4) ch 1. 
61 See, for example, L Tørres (ed), The Smoking Business: Tobacco Workers in Malawi (Fafo Report No 39,
Institute for Applied Social Science, Oslo 2000) ch 3 at Fafo Foundation, ‘Fafo-Report 339:
Tobacco Tenants in Malawi’ <http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/339/> accessed 18 January 2007
where these risks are explained for the particular case of the Malawian tobacco tenant workers. See
also S Lastarria-Cornhiel and J Melmed-Sanjak, Land Tenancy in Asia, Africa and Latin America: a Look
at the Past and a View to the Future (Working Paper No 27, Land Tenure Centre, University of
Wisconsin, Madison 1999) <http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=1265>
accessed 18 January 2007. 
the reinvestment of profits in the holdings.62 From a developmental perspective, a
lack of security of tenure undermines the personal development of the tenant
worker and his family63 . From a legal perspective, the tenant worker has been sub-
ject to summary evictions leading to social hardship.
In order to address the problems of the tenant worker it is suggested that
Malawi may learn from the specific experience of South Africa.  First, the experi-
ence of South Africa is instructive with regard to the question of conversion of per-
sonal rights to proprietary rights, in particular to the protection of the tenant
worker against successors in title of private estate owners.  Under the Africans on
Private Estates Act, a common law- and equity-based land regulatory framework,
land law in Malawi provides a framework within which the tenant worker may
seek to claim legal or equitable proprietary rights. However, the common law
route provides the tenant worker with little assurance, since it is dependent on
either the cooperation of the private estate owner or on the satisfaction of elements
beyond the capacity of the tenant worker.64
Secondly, South Africa’s experience is informative in relation to its develop-
ment of a statutory framework that incorporates detailed terms under which
tenure is made more secure. This experience provides Malawi with a basis for
developing a statutory framework appropriate to the circumstances of the tenant
worker. The lack of secure tenure that the Malawian tenant worker has experi-
enced despite the existence of the Africans on Private Estates Act is largely due to
the way the Act is formulated. The tenant worker is not given legal rights directly;
rather, the rights of the tenant worker depend on the actions of the minister. 
E LAND LAW REFORM AS A CONTEMPORARY RESPONSE TO
HISTORICAL INEQUITY
1 South Africa’s Response to Historical Inequity
Prior to and following the establishment of a democratic regime in South Africa,
there was a recognition of the need to correct the historical and race-based injustice
endured by an overwhelming part of the population. Naturally, race-based injustice
in the acquisition and ownership of land was identified as an area that required
urgent redress through land reform. South Africa’s land reform programme com-
prises three main components: restitution, redistribution and tenure reform.65
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62 Lastarria-Cornhiel and Melmed-Sanjak (n 61) 7–8, 39. 
63 Tørres (n 61) 44 ff; Lastarria-Cornhiel and Melmed-Sanjak (n 61) 7–8, 39.
64 See pp 220–21, below. 
65 White Paper on South African Land Policy (n 10) [2.3]; DL Carey Miller, ‘The Reform of South
African Land Law in its Roman-Dutch Context: New Wine?’ in Jackson and Wilde (n 60) 287;
Carey Miller and Pope (n 10) 173; S Sibanda, ‘Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in 
South Africa’ (SARPN Conference on Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Southern Africa,
Pretoria 2001) <http://www.sarpn.org.za/EventPapers/Land/20010604Sibanda.pdf> accessed
27 December 2006.
In light of all the historical events surrounding South African labour tenancy,
the legislative measures were undertaken to address this issue through land tenure
reform were more than called for.66 In the South African Constitution, provisions
were established supporting the land tenure reform process. Among such provi-
sions s 25(1), regulating the deprivation of property, can be cited. Likewise, s 25(5)
enjoins the state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures within its avail-
able resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on
an equitable basis’. Similarly, s 25(6) requires promulgation of legislation whose
purpose is tenure reform in order to undertake corrective action in relation to 
insecure tenure of individuals or communities as a result of ‘past racially discrim-
inatory laws or practices’.
The approaches to the treatment of land rights in South African land law are com-
parable to the approaches taken in common law jurisdictions. South African land
law, like Malawian land law, is a system of hierarchical interests in land. Equally,
South Africa’s conveyancing law is reliant on registration, which facilitates the ‘prin-
ciple of publicity underlying the law of property’ and provides ‘the necessary security
of title’ for the enforcement and protection of ‘rights against the public at large’.67
Ownership and limited real rights constitute proprietary rights, thus allowing for
their registration.68 A limited registrable right is recognised as a proprietary right on
the basis that it is a right that constitutes a ‘subtraction from the dominium’.69
Interests that are less than ownership and less than limited registrable rights are not
proprietary since they ‘merely place an obligation on a specific person’,70 as opposed
to obligations on the property itself. Because of this, the rights of South African
labour tenants, previously non-registrable, were vulnerable, as they were only capa-
ble of limited protection. Consequently, land law reform radically shifted the ortho-
doxy of registration of land rights, which now has to accommodate and enhance
hitherto non-registrable rights ‘at the expense of the right of ownership.’71
Land law reform seeks to secure hitherto precarious forms of tenure through a
rights-based approach—as opposed to a permits-based—approach.72 Prior to
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66 White Paper on South African Land Policy (n 10) [225]; Carey Miller and Pope (n 10) 188–90;
Carey Miller (n 65) 298–99.
67 H Mostert, ‘The Diversification of Land Rights and its Implications for a New Land Law in South
Africa: An Appraisal Concentrating on the Transformation of the South African System of Title
Registration’ in E Cooke (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law (Hart, Oxford 2003) vol II, 4 . 
68 Mostert (n 67) 4. 
69 Mostert (n 67) 5. Rights that ‘subtract from the dominium’ are registrable because they bind third
parties and successors in title although it is not settled what constitutes such a right. Similarly under
the English common law based jurisdictions, a right is proprietary because it binds successors in title
and a right binds a successor in title because it is proprietary. For a discussion of what is put forward
as a principled and rule based criteria for determining a proprietary right as opposed to this circu-
larity, see S Bright, ‘Of Estates and Interests: A Tale of Ownership’ in S Bright and J Dewar (eds),
Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (OUP, Oxford 1998).
70 Mostert (n 67) 4.
71 Carey Miller and Pope (n 10) 191.
72 See P McAuslan, ‘Making Law Work: Restructuring Land Relations in Africa’ (1998) 29
Development and Change 525, 528 where it is stated: ‘Land reform in South Africa, then, must
reform specific to the situation of the labour tenant, the rights of tenure enjoyed
by the labour tenant were very limited and depended on the goodwill of the farm
owner and the state. Over and above, through the adoption of a rights-based
approach, South Africa’s land law reform aims to spell out in detail the relative
rights and obligations of the farm owner and the labour tenant. This approach is
intended to create certainty by both removing doubts and the possibility for unrea-
sonable and unlawful conduct. As McAuslan observes:
the law has to be much more specific, detailed and clear. Such aspects as the nature and
limits of private rights; how they may be acquired, disposed of, burdened, lost; the whole
issue of third party rights; and, where the state is to remain involved, a more exact demar-
cation of state power and its limits… these all have to be spelt out in detail so that all those
who have private rights, or intend to try to obtain private rights in land can predict with
reasonable certainty the scope and operation of the law applicable to those rights.73
Land tenure and land law reform in South Africa has two aspects potentially rel-
evant to land law reform in Malawi. 
The first aspect of land tenure reform in South Africa is the ‘adjustment of the
correlative position between landowner and the holder of lesser rights’ in land.74
The legislative instrument used for the adjustment of the relative positions of the
farm owner and the labour tenant is the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act75
(hereinafter ‘Labour Tenants Act’). It provides a framework for the detailed regu-
lation and enhancement of tenure security under the labour tenancy contract. For
the Labour Tenants Act, a ‘labour tenant’ is a person
(a) who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm;
(b) who has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land on the farm,
referred to in paragraph (a), or another farm of the owner, and in considera-
tion of such right provides or has provided labour to the owner or lessee; and
(c) whose parent or grandparent resided or resides on a farm and had the use of
cropping or grazing land on such farm or another farm of the owner, and in
consideration of such right provided or provides labour to the owner or lessee
of such or such other farm [and a successor to a labour tenant but excluding a
farmworker].76
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include land law reform because it seeks to change the nature of the legal regime and the legal cul-
ture that applies to African-held land. It is to replace, at best, licences or permits held at the mercy
of law, with rights guaranteed by law’ (italics in the original). See also Carey Miller and Pope (n 10)
172–73.
73 McAuslan 1998 (n 72) 536.
74 Carey Miller and Pope (n 10) 167; J Pienaar, ‘Extending Security of Tenure in South Africa: Labour
Tenants and Farm Workers’ in Jackson and Wilde (n 60) 317; B Cousins, How do Rights Become Real?
Formal and Informal Institutions in South Africa’s Reform Programme (International Conference on Land
Tenure in the Developing World with a Focus on Southern Africa 1998) <http://www.geomatics.
ucalgary.ca/~barry/Research/Publications/Publications%20Page/PublicationsOnWeb/
capetown.PDF> accessed 27 December 2006.
75 Act 3 of 1996.
76 South Africa Labour Tenants Act (n 75) s 1.
The Act has facilitated a readjustment of the relative positions the farmland owner
and the labour tenant have in relation to their respctive rights in land, as the farm
owner is now compelled to observe legal procedure, without thereby questioning
the legitimacy of the ownership rights of the farmland owner. The labour tenant’s
right to occupation of the farmland may be terminated if the labour tenant waives
his or her right of occupation, dies, is evicted or after the labour tenant acquires
ownership rights or other rights in the land occupied.77
Moreover, and in stark contrast to the violence, unfairness and indignity the
labour tenants previously endured in this regard, the Labour Tenants Act also
provides for a clearer procedure for eviction of labour tenants. This presupposes
and reinforces the notion that occupation is contingent on the satisfaction of 
prescribed conditions. A labour tenant may be evicted where, contrary to the
agreement between the parties, he refuses or fails to provide labour to the farm-
land owner or where he commits a material breach of the conditions of the rela-
tionship between him or her and the farmland owner. In either case, the eviction
must be only on the basis of a court order where it is recognised as just and 
equitable.78 Additionally, the Labour Tenants Act provides that a labour tenant
cannot be evicted after the attainment of the age of 60 or if on account of disabil-
ity he is unable to personally provide labour. In neither case is the labour tenant
obliged to nominate a person to provide labour on his behalf.79
The second aspect of land tenure reform in South Africa of relevance to Malawi
is the conversion of the previously personal rights of the labour tenant to propri-
etary rights. This conversion has been achieved through the Extension of Security
of Tenure Act80 (hereinafter ‘Extension of Security of Tenure Act’) and, arguably
through the Labour Tenants Act. 
The Labour Tenants Act does not expressly address the issue whether the
labour tenant has protection against successors in title of the landowner and nei-
ther has a court conclusively dealt with this matter. In contrast to the Labour
Tenants Act, s 24 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act expressly provides
that the ‘rights of an occupier shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be bind-
ing on a successor in title of an owner or person in charge of the land concerned.’
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act is therefore an explicit instance of land
tenure and land law reform in South Africa where personal rights are converted
to proprietary rights. 
Nevertheless, following the promulgation of the Land Affairs General
Amendment Act No. 51 of 2001, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act is now
applicable to the labour tenancy contract.81 Additionally, it may also be argued
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77 See South Africa Labour Tenants Act (n 75) s 3(2)(a)–(d). 
78 See South Africa Labour Tenants Act (n 75) ss 7, 15 where ‘normal’ and ‘urgent’ eviction proceed-
ings are regulated, respectively. 
79 South Africa Labour Tenants Act (n 75) s 9.
80 Act 62 of 1997.
81 See s 6(a) where s 1(1)(x)(a) of the South African Extension of Security of Tenure Act (n 80) is
repealed. It was this section of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act the one which excluded the
that the huur gaat voor koop rule applies to the circumstances of the labour tenant as
it does to a tenant under a short lease at South Africa’s common law.82
The labour tenant’s now recognised and registrable right of occupation was
subjected to conditions as well. The desire on the part of some labour tenants to
retain ownership rights in relation to the land they occupy could only be realised
under the special procedure provided for in the Labour Tenants Act. The memo-
randum to the Bill whereby the Labour Tenants Acts was originally introduced in
Parliament clarified that ‘the aim of the Bill is neither to promote nor to entrench
the system, but to ensure that in the process of its transformation and demise, the
basic human rights of all parties are protected under a stable legal system’.83
In order to acquire ownership rights or other rights in land otherwise held by
the farmland owner, the labour tenant—or the labour tenant’s successor in title—
was required within four years of the commencement of the Act to apply to the
Director-General of Land Affairs for an award of land, land rights and for finan-
cial assistance in that regard.84 The labour tenant had to show that the land in
question was under his occupation or that of his predecessors for a period of five
years prior to the coming into force of the Labour Tenants Act. However, ‘the
right to apply to be awarded such land, rights in land and servitudes’ must have
been exercised on or before 31 March 2001.85 A labour tenant who successfully
applied for such right ceased to be governed by the scheme of the Act, on the basis
that he or she now became an independent owner of land or holder of land rights.
2 Malawi’s Response to Historical Inequity in the Tenant Worker’s 
Contract
Following the re-introduction of competitive politics in Malawi, the rural popula-
tion made clear demands for a review of land ownership and access to land. This
demand may be justified constitutionally by reference to Chapters III (fundamen-
tal principles of national policy) and IV (the bill of rights) of the Constitution of
Malawi.86 s 13(e) (a principle of national policy) enjoins the state to ‘enhance the
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labour tenant from the definition of ‘occupier’ and hence of the application of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act. 
82 See Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969, s 1 (2) where a short lease is defined
as a ‘lease for a period of not less than 10 years’. Under the huur gaat voor koop rule (meaning ‘the hire
goes before the purchase’ or loosely ‘the lease goes before the sale’), a lessee of land only has a per-
sonal right against the lesser unless and until the lessee assumes possession of property.  Only when
the assumption of possession takes place does a lessee have protection against successors in title of
the lessor.  In this regard, see P.J. Badenhorst, Juanita M. Pienaar and Hanri Mostert, Silberberg and
Schoeman’s the Law of Property (4th edn LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban 2003) 501 ff. 
83 See Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Bill, 1995 <http://www.polity.co.za/html/govdocs/bills/1995/
labtneng.txt> accessed 10 January 2007. See also Pienaar (n 74) 318.
84 South Africa Labour Tenants Act (n 75) ss 16-28; Carey Miller and Pope (n 10) 189–90; Pienaar (n
74) 315–16.
85 South Africa Labour Tenants Act (n 75) s 16(1).
86 See Constitution of Malawi (n 9).
quality of life in rural communities and to recognise rural standards of living as a
key indicator of the success of Government policies’. s 30(3), a provision in the bill
of rights stipulates that ‘the state shall take measures to introduce reforms aimed
at eradicating social injustices and inequalities’. Furthermore, the Constitution of
Malawi—specifically ss 28 (2) and 44 (4) or the ‘property clauses’—recognise the
distinction between ‘deprivation’ and ‘expropriation’ of property, thereby
enabling the state to alter private rights held in land without thereby violating the
Constitution.87
Furthermore, Malawi has formulated and adopted what is dubbed a ‘compre-
hensive land policy’88 after a process of public consultation overseen by the
Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform. This reform aims to
create a long term framework for the development of land administration, forms
of tenure, land use, planning and environmental management.89 A notable but
unfortunate aspect of land policy in this regard is the absence of any mention of
the presence of the tenant worker on the private estate.90 This does not mean that
Malawi’s land policy necessarily and definitively rejects private estate commodity
production by tenant workers. The problem is that although the tenant worker’s
deplorable social, economic and legal conditions in the private estate have been
acknowledged by various sectors of the population, this new land policy does not
make any reference to the tenant worker, to the tenant worker’s contract or to the
obvious need to undertake corrective action in this regard.91 That is a strong indi-
cation that land policy will not address the social, economic and legal deficit dis-
played by the tenant worker’s contract, at least not within the context of any land
law reform initiative. It is noteworthy that corrective legislative action has been
envisaged outside the land law reform process, although all efforts in this regard
have come to naught thus far.92
F THE CASE FOR INCORPORATING SOUTH AFRICAN REFORMS IN MALAWI
South Africa’s Labour Tenants Act and the legal situation of the South African
labour tenant provide a useful and informative basis for the analysis of the legal
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87 This view is potentially contentious because courts in Malawi have not specifically addressed the
existence of the distinction. 
88 Malawi Land Policy Document (n 8) [1.1.1].
89 Malawi Land Policy Document (n 8) [1.5].
90 Although the change in land policy is timely, it is submitted there exists a compelling need to deter-
mine the practical effects of such a policy change in terms of its impact on the welfare considera-
tions of the social relations that have been built around the private estate sector economy.
91 The legislature specifically identifies ‘tenant share cropper’ as a person who may potentially be cov-
ered by the definition employee in s 3 of Malawi’s Employment Act, 1999 (No. 6 of 2000).
Incidentally, it is noteworthy in this context that the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions actively
campaigns against the use of child labour in the tenant worker’s contract. 
92 A bill to regulate the tenant worker’s contract independent from the land reform process has been
in the legislative process for the last 10 years. It has not yet been enacted as far as the author knows.
situation of the Malawian tenant worker.  Three distinct but related arguments
may be made to the effect that the Malawian tenant worker is in a position simi-
lar to that of the South African labour tenant prior to the enactment and imple-
mentation of the Labour Tenants Act in South Africa. Consequently, the remedies
South African labour tenant have benefited from may equally benefit the
Malawian tenant worker. 
1 The Tenant Worker’s Rights should be Considered Real (In Rem),
Registrable Rights
The first argument is premised on the assumption that the tenant worker’s con-
tract creates and gives the tenant worker a personal right to use land on a private
estate. The tenure that the Malawian tenant worker enjoys, therefore, is secure
only to the extent that the landowner wishes the tenant worker to continue to use
his land. Any action the tenant worker may wish to institute with regard to land
use can only lie against the private estate owner and not against the land per se.
In other words, the right of the tenant worker is personal, as opposed to ‘real’ (in
rem) or proprietary rights. 
This is a problem for the tenant worker. Because his or her rights can be
described as non-proprietary, they are not registrable. If one additionally noted
that the description above does not entirely account for the complexities underly-
ing the tenant worker’s situation, the need for a legislative framework in the man-
ner of South Africa’s Labour Tenants Act or the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act ought to be put in place in order to rectify the tenant worker’s position.  It is
submitted that the South African approach should be considered in this respect on
account of the difficulties that the tenant worker may encounter with the common-
law-based land law.   
The tenant worker may also be described, in the context of a common law
based jurisdiction, as an individual with potential informal or inchoate rights in
land. The principles of equity—in particular its remedial rules—may provide the
Malawian tenant worker with a mechanism enabling the vindication of inchoate
proprietary rights. Consequently, on the basis of the principles of equity, a defini-
tive statement cannot be made that the tenant worker’s contract could not be con-
ceived as a contractual arrangement with proprietary implications. 
This reliance on equity, however, has its pitfalls. The Malawian tenant worker
may seek aid from equity’s remedial rules only where a land access mechanism can
conceptually be established.93 The tenant worker is not in the best position to sat-
isfy the requirements of equity in this respect. Generally, equitable intervention
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93 See K Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47 CLP 157, 163 where it is stated: ‘An equitable right of
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with proprietary implications is premised on the assumption that the plaintiff has
a prior, existing, continuing and legitimate claim of a proprietary nature that
ought to be recognised.94 Structurally speaking, the remedial rules of equity are
conditional and contingent in relation to the contractual transactions they purport
to regulate. ‘Conditionality’ relates to the basis for intervention, which in turn is
premised on whether a wrong has been done, whether it falls within specific cat-
egories of wrongs, and whether it is directly attributable to the alleged wrongdoer.
‘Contingency’ rests on the fact that mere observation of an occurrence of a wrong
is not sufficient. The occurrence of the wrong must be formally established, cor-
rective measures must actively be pursued against the alleged wrongdoer and a
remedy obtained. 
In other words, a right that arises or is threatened as a consequence of the wrong
observed is merely inchoate: it must be given concrete form in a competent court
of equity. In order to do this, however, the tenant worker must be able to access
competent courts and lawyers—generally inaccessible to them—and must bear
the costs of a legal process of an uncertain outcome. The observations made about
the limitations the South African labour tenant has historically had in dealing with
the technical aspects of law equally apply to the Malawian tenant worker. Any
attempt by the tenant workers to establish a pre-existing estate or interest will be
undermined by his infirmities socially, financially, educationally and because of
lack of knowledge and accessibility of the law. It is therefore clear that the com-
mon law and equity offers the tenant worker little comfort and hence the need to
seriously consider the development of a regime that secures the position of the ten-
ant worker.
2 The Malawian Tenant Worker’s Rights Should be Considered
Proprietary Rights
The second argument is premised on the relevance of construing the rights of the
tenant worker as proprietary, particularly in relation to the question whether the
tenant worker ought to have protection against a successor in title of the private
estate owner. This is especially significant in the light of the intentions expressed
in Malawi’s land policy.  Malawi’s Land Policy Document spells out the state’s
intent towards the restructuring of land relations. The implementation of this pol-
icy may have consequences for the private estate sector. The policy document
commits the state to respect and to effectively protect the rights held under the 
customary land tenure system and to facilitate the operation of institutions of 
customary land tenure. The attitude towards customary land tenure has been
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identified as a candidate for reform. As part of a common and widely accepted
regional trend, reform in this regard heralds a shift in the previous conceptions
held with respect to indigenous forms of land tenure and new found respect for
these forms of tenure.95
This re-alignment should have an impact on private estates, the tenant worker
and the tenant worker’s contract in Malawi. In the context of agriculture, this atti-
tude change represents a systematic effort towards bringing about ‘sustainable
agricultural productivity and transformation’ through a shift in emphasis from pri-
vate estate to small farm agriculture. At the very least, the proposed changes reflect
a shift in priorities. From a legal perspective, the reversal of policy in practice
entails that customary institutions of land tenure will reclaim their dominant posi-
tion with regard to title to leased private estate land. The policy document makes
an unequivocal statement that the reversionary interest in relation to the leases
made out to private estate operators vests in the customary institutions of land
tenure.96 Consequently, upon the determination of private estate land lease, the
institutions of customary land tenure should retain the right and authority to
decide on the future course of action. 
Nevertheless, the course of action set by the land policy fails to address the legal
consequences this approach implies. The tenant workers are a distinct group of
land users. Land Reform policy affects this group in a significantly different man-
ner than it does other groups of land users. Therefore, appropriate legislation
aimed at avoiding undue hardship for the tenant worker should include the devel-
opment of a framework similar to that of s 24 of South Africa’s Extension of
Security of Tenure Act.
3 The Malawian Tenant Worker would benefit from Enhanced
Security of Tenure
A third argument is premised on the present absence of security of tenure.
Although the Africans on Private Estate Act provides a framework by which the
minister may enhance the security of tenure of the Malawian tenant worker, the
Act has not been enforced. As pointed out above, the tenant worker’s contract is
a contractual arrangement envisaged by s 25 of the Africans on Private Estates
Act. As a contractual relation constituted within the framework of s 25, the tenant
worker’s contract ought to be assessed by the minister responsible in order to
determine whether it secures the tenure that the tenant worker enjoys. The nature
of the legal regime formulated under s 25 is such that the tenure enjoyed by the
tenant worker under the Act is permit-based and thus dependent on the initiative
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of the minister, who has proved to be ineffective in discharging these duties. To
date, the minister responsible has opted not to interfere with contractual relations
constituted on the private estates including the tenant worker’s contract. This fact
exemplifies the ‘nature of the legal regime and the legal culture’ identified by
McAuslan,97 from which the rights based and elaborate approach to land rights
seeks to move away from. 
Malawi’s Africans on Private Estates Act is not specific, detailed or clear. The
tenant worker’s circumstances, in relation to security of tenure, require interven-
tion through the development of a new, more detailed legal regime that elaborates
on the terms under which the tenant worker enjoys tenure. Additionally, a detailed
procedure ought to be adhered to if a private estate owner wishes to terminate the
tenant worker’s contract or evict the tenant worker.  The approach adopted in the
South African land law reform initiative and exemplified by the Labour Tenant’s
Act is an instructive reference point. 
G CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the land law reform process in Malawi must incorporate a
legislative framework which attempts to address the deplorable social, economic
and developmental state of the tenant worker on the private estate. This article has
attempted to analyse the tenant worker’s contract and the labour tenancy contract
in the context of the land reform processes currently undertaken in Malawi and
South Africa respectively. 
Although in general terms the Malawian tenant worker’s contract and the
South African labour tenancy contract share similar features, the contemporary
responses to their respective situations have been different in both jurisdictions.
Under the auspices of the land reform process, South Africa has undertaken a con-
certed effort to improve the situation of the labour tenant and to act against the
consequences of the historical inequity that plagues labour tenancy. To date, the
Malawian land law reform process has failed to highlight the obvious need for cor-
rective action aimed at alleviating the social, economic and legal problems with
which the tenant worker is confronted with.    In the light of such a glaring omis-
sion, it is suggested that South Africa’s land law reform offers an instructive and
informative reference point. In particular, South Africa’s Labour Tenants Act and
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act incorporate legal aspects that may be par-
ticularly useful in any attempt Malawi may make to address the tenant worker’s
situation. 
More specifically, Malawi may benefit from South Africa’s experience in two
areas addressed by the Labour Tenants Act and the Extension of Security of
Tenure Act:
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1 The Labour Tenants Act incorporates a detailed legal regime of enjoyment of
tenure for the South African labour tenant, as well as a detailed procedure that
ought to be adhered to in the event that a landowner wishes to terminate the
labour tenant contract or evict the labour tenant. 
2 In light of the fact that private estate lands may revert to their ostensible own-
ers, it is necessary that the tenure the private estate owner enjoys be protected
against such third parties as happens in South Africa through the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act.  
In spite of being held out as a model for emulation the implementation, South
Africa’s land reform process has had its problems98 and some of these difficulties
are likely to occur in the Malawi land reform process. Consequently getting
acquainted with the problems encountered by South Africa in the implementation
of both the Labour Tenants Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act
ought to be viewed as a first positive step towards the successful land law reform
with regard to the relations of Malawian tenant workers and estate owners. 
As was the case in the implementation of the Labour Tenants Act for South
Africa, a statutory initiative aimed at bolstering the position of the tenant worker
on the private estate is likely to encounter hostility from the private estate owners
in Malawi. Moreover, hostility to this process may come from the Malawian cus-
tomary landowners who have reversionary interests in some private estate lands.
During the period leading to and subsequent to the promulgation of the Labour
Tenants and the Extension of Security of Tenure Acts, ‘evictions peaked’ in South
Africa, signalling hostility to the process by landowners.99 The implementation
process under the Labour Tenants Act in South Africa has also been dogged by
‘the sheer scale and cost of the programme relative to the resources and capacity’
of the Department of Land Affairs.100
Similarly, in the context of the general land reform programme in Malawi the
challenges presented by the scale and the cost of reform have been identified as
factors likely to slow down the implementation of land reform.101 Reform of land
law aimed at ‘adjusting the relative positions’ of the tenant worker and the private
estate owner will have to contend with specific and fundamental issues if the pro-
gramme is to succeed. For instance, it will be necessary to determine the potential
number of tenant workers, the criteria for determining who a tenant worker is, or
whether there will be criteria for identifying private estates that have tenant work-
ers. Additionally, the development of a rights awareness campaign among tenant
workers and the development of administrative and judicial or quasi-judicial insti-
tutional capacity seem to be necessary in this regard. 
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The formulation of a legislative framework for Malawi can also be justified on
the grounds of regional and domestic imperatives. Land reform in the contem-
porary polities of the Southern Africa region is recognised as driven by the inter-
play of political, economic, social and cultural factors.102 Land reform has
acquired visibility because of the space accorded to ‘contested democratic politics’,
which have compelled political systems to ‘meet the concerns of the rural vot-
ers’.103 In the context of the Southern African Development Cooperation group-
ing (SADC), the security and future prosperity of the region is tied in with its
capacity within to settle longstanding grievances over injustices related to land
tenure.104
Finally, there are domestic reasons to implement such a legislative framework.
The views expressed by the people of Malawi through consultative processes and
on the basis of constitutional provisions support this. The Presidential Commission
of Inquiry into Land Policy Reform in its report observed that a diversity of con-
stituencies in Malawi, including the tenant workers, expressed the desire for land
tenure reform. The Government of Malawi is obliged by the Malawian
Constitution to ensure that its policies and practices ‘enhance the quality of life in
rural communities’. The tenant worker belongs to a distinct class within Malawian
rural communities, with needs which must be addressed through policy and prac-
tice. The tenant worker is a small farmer by right, who happens not to own land
in the conventional sense. The tenant worker’s problems cannot simply be wished
away. The current land reform process should serve as a vehicle for addressing the
peculiar needs of the tenant worker in a context of comprehensive and sustainable
reform. South Africa’s experience in this regard may thus be invaluable, both in
terms of the conceptual framework it has created and of the problems it has faced
in implementing such a framework.
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